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Board Gender Diversity, ESG and Corporate Performance
Introduction
Investing in sustainability is key for a firm’s long-term performance. Firms need to be
able to address the interests of multiple stakeholders and their impact on society. Through
sustainability management, firms benefit by engaging with various stakeholders, creating value
for more than just the shareholders. Sustainability management involves embracing the economic
and the environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors and examining its impact. In the
field of finance, scholars and practitioners alike are especially attuned to sustainability’s ESG
factors and the importance of managing ESG to ensure firm short term and long-term success.
Indeed, empirical research has established a positive relationship between ESG factors and firm
performance.
Given the importance of ESG on firm success, scholars are increasingly investigating
factors that influence decisions about ESG. Examples include the size of the firm, the industry it
operates in and certain governance characteristics. One especially important governance
characteristic is the composition of the board and the level of diversity. Departing from
traditional homogenous boards and increasing the diversity within the board can highly benefit
firms. Diversity brings in different expertise and perspectives that can potentially elevate the
decision-making process, which is needed in an increasingly multicultural society. The thinking
is that more diverse boards will consider varying points of view when making critical decisions
which will reduce the firm’s exposure to environmental and social risks.
One key indicator of board diversity is gender diversity. Women currently are highly
underrepresented in the boardroom, holding only 22.5% of board seats within Fortune 500
companies. This is unfortunate because board gender diversity could highly benefit the firm as
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women bring unique characteristics with them to the boardroom. They influence the board’s
advisory and monitoring role through improving governance and increasing the heterogeneity
through their different knowledge, values and experiences. Increased gender diversity allows
them to better address the many different interests of multiple stakeholders. Researchers have
sought to study the relationship between board gender diversity and firm performance but,
despite its intuitive appeal, results are ambiguous. Some studies lend support for the thesis that
board gender diversity enhances performance. Others have found just the opposite. One
explanation for disparate results is that the influence of board gender diversity is complex such
that the effect of board gender diversity on performance is realized through important
organizational decisions and strategies. For example, it could be that board gender diversity
influences a firm’s ESG factors, which in turn influence performance. The logic is that increased
board gender diversity allows the board to better address the interest of all stakeholders, which is
done through sustainability management. This can eventually lead to better firm performance.
Research has not yet investigated these effects, however. This thesis attempts to fill that research
gap by studying the relationship between board gender diversity and ESG performance. The
conceptual model underlying this thesis is presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1
Conceptual Model

Board Gender
Diversity

ESG

Financial
Performance

The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature review
and presents the research hypothesis. Section 3 reviews the research design, including the sample
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selection, the methodology and the variables used. Section 4 presents the results. Finally, section
5 discusses the results, including considerations for practitioners and future research.
Literature review and hypothesis development
Investing in sustainability
Firm performance depends on how firms strategize and how they operate in both market
and non-market environments (Orlitzky et al., 2003). According to stakeholder theory, because
businesses are ingrained within society, they have, up to a certain level, the duty to better the
welfare of society. They are not only responsible to shareholders, but their actions also impact
multiple stakeholders (Galbreath, 2016). Freeman (1984) defines stakeholders as “any group or
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (p.
46). In general, stakeholders include shareholders, employees, communities, the environment,
suppliers and governments (Galbreath, 2016). Business practices that do not consider the values
and requirements of society can be detrimental in the long run, therefore businesses need to be
able to reconcile the multiple interests of different stakeholder groups. A key tool to achieve
effective stakeholder communication is sustainable management activities (Velte, 2016).
Corporate sustainability is strategic management business practice intended to build
resilience among firms by fulfilling the interests of present and future stakeholders. Businesses
not only have to focus on delivering outcomes in the short run, but they must also preserve the
human and natural resources they need to continue to perform well in the future (Artiach et al.,
2010).
There is a strong business case as to why firms should invest in sustainability. First, the
firm can gain a competitive advantage through engaging with stakeholders. Departing from the
traditional business model of aiming to create value for just shareholders, sustainable businesses
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aim to create value for all stakeholders. It is important to continually address all stakeholders so
the firm can be better informed and positioned to handle economic, regulatory, social and
environmental changes and avoid conflicts that are detrimental to creating value (Whelan &
Fink, 2017).
Second, sustainable businesses can improve their management of risk. Firms should
invest today in building capacity for the long term and in developing adaptive strategies to
manage multiple forms of social and environmental risks. Those risks manifest in many
dimensions out of the firm’s control over the long term, for example climate change, water
scarcity and poor labor conditions (Whelan & Fink, 2017). Indeed, Kumar et al. (2016)
demonstrated in their study that firms with high ESG performance are less risky than their peer
industry group. They studied 12 industry groups, and the results showed that the group of firms
with high ESG performance exhibited lower stock return volatility (on average 28.67% less)
compared to the rest of the companies in the same industry.
Third, investing in sustainability fosters innovation. Firms are exposed to many new
business opportunities when they encourage innovation that meets environmental standards and
social needs. Firms also need to recognize that there is a growing interest from consumers in
sustainable products; innovation driven by sustainability can aid them in solving these consumer
challenges (Whelan & Fink, 2017).
Fourth, sustainable firms increasingly gain the loyalty of customers. Customers nowadays
expect firms to be transparent and honest, and they seek more and more products from
businesses that have integrity, are socially responsible, and are sustainable to the core (Whelan &
Fink, 2017). McKinsey research found that sustainability can drive consumer preference, as
customers are willing to pay to be more sustainable. They found that more than 70% of
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consumers are willing to pay an extra 5% for a sustainable product if it performs as well as a
non-sustainable alternative (Koller et al., 2019).
Last, sustainable firms can better attract and engage employees. Firms that have
sustainability at their core can attract quality employees by sharing with them a sense of higher
purpose. Research has also found a positive correlation between positive social impact and
higher job satisfaction. Employee motivation increases when they feel a sense of purpose,
ultimately increasing productivity. In addition, studies have shown that there is a positive
relationship between employee satisfaction and shareholder returns (Koller et al., 2019).
In sum, scholars are increasingly finding the positive impacts of sustainability initiatives
within firms. Because it focuses on enhancing value to all stakeholders, sustainability helps
ensure short term and long-term success.
Relationship between ESG and corporate performance
Corporate sustainability performance considers “the extent to which a firm embraces
economic, environmental, social and governance factors into its operations, and ultimately the
impact they exert on the firm and society” (Artiach et al., 2010, p. 32). This concept is especially
attractive to the financial industry, so, not surprisingly, sustainable investing has been gaining
popularity and traction. Morgan Stanley’s Institute for Sustainable Investing defines sustainable
investing as “the practice of investing in companies or funds that aim to achieve market rate
financial returns while pursuing positive social and/or environmental impact” (Morgan Stanley,
2019, p. 3). More than 85% of individual investors are interested in sustainable investing and
more fund managers are incorporating environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria in
their investment process (Morgan Stanley, 2019; Hale, 2019).
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There has been increasing research interest focused on the relationship of ESG factors
and firm performance, dating back to the 1970s (Friede et al., 2015). ESG factors are measures
of a firm’s management of risk, the competence of management, and non-financial performance.
ESG factors take into consideration issues such as the environment (e.g. climate change, energy
and water use, carbon emissions), social responsibility (e.g. fair-trade principles, human rights,
product safety, gender equality, health and safety) and corporate governance (e.g. board
independence, corruption bribery, reporting and disclosure, shareholder protection (Galbreath,
2012). Friede, Busch and Bassen meta-analyzed results of many previous academic research
papers and, based on the aggregated results of 2,200 individual studies, they detected strong
empirical evidence for the business case for ESG investing. 90% of the studies they examined
found a non-negative relationship (i.e., either a positive impact or no impact) between ESG and
corporate performance, with a large portion of the studies finding a positive relationship.
Factors that affect ESG
Because a firm’s ESG overall performance has the potential to positively affect its
performance, it is important to consider what factors influence ESG. That is, why do some firms
evidence low ESG performance (i.e., high risk) while others demonstrate high ESG performance
(i.e., low risk). Past research has investigated some influential variables. First, firm size. Firms
that are larger draw more attention from more stakeholders, the government and the public.
“Larger firms are more likely to create correspondingly larger social problems because of the
sheer scale and prominence of their activities. For example, pollution emissions to some extent
will be a function of the size of operations” (Artiach et al., 2010, p. 36). This will likely
influence how the firm strategically responds to the demands of multiple stakeholders, as larger
firms face more scrutiny from the public and face more external pressures. Firms that are larger
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are also more likely to realize the advantage of scale economies from sustainable activities
(Artiach et al., 2010).
Second, the firm’s leverage might affect a firm’s ESG performance because it indicates
how important financial stakeholders are relative to other stakeholders. The firm’s creditors are a
powerful stakeholder group because they supply capital to the firm. With higher leverage,
management might prioritize addressing the concerns of debtholders over other stakeholders,
causing the firm to have a more short-term view in its operations and investments (Artiach et al.,
2010; Haque, 2017). Firms with higher leverage might have less free cash flows and financial
resources as they must devote those resources to service their debt, which can lead to a decline in
ESG initiatives like climate related activism (Haque, 2017).
The same applies to firms with high growth, as they are more likely to be scrutinized by
external finance providers, like creditors, so they might put more pressure on management to
reduce investments towards sustainability (Kyaw et al., 2017). Hence, those firms are more
likely to exhibit poor ESG performance.
Fourth, the profitability of a firm is likely to influence the investments it decides to take
on. When the firm is profitable, there is less pressure from its financial stakeholders, hence the
firm has more capacity and freedom to invest in programs towards sustainability, such as battling
climate change or focusing on employee engagement. Being profitable allows the firm to still
meet shareholder expectations, while also allowing them to meet the demands of other
stakeholders through sustainable investments. If the firm is not profitable, management faces
pressure to maximize returns to financial stakeholders and reduce costs (Artiach et al., 2010).
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Fifth, studies have shown a positive impact from the representation of independent
directors, as there is evidence showing that independent directors are more likely to advocate
socially responsible behavior (Villiers et al., 2011).
Sixth, firms in different industries experience different effects from ESG factors. High
ESG performance affects different industries on varying levels, the strongest impact being on the
materials, banking, energy and technology industry. For example, the difference in volatility
between the ESG and reference companies in the food and beverage industry is 6.10%. On the
other hand, the difference in volatility within the energy industry is 50.75%. ESG performance
also affects each industry in varying degrees. There is a drastic difference in volatility between
industries for average performing companies. For example, the difference in volatilities between
energy (most volatile) and insurance (least volatile) is 47%. But for the group of high ESG
performing companies, the volatility of those industries become much more similar, with a
difference of only 11% (Kumar et al., 2016).
Various industries face different levels of exposure to environmental and social risk,
which would in turn affect their ESG performance as well. For example, the oil and gas sector
has been identified as the sector most exposed to those risks, since it is by nature “exposed to
GHG emission, pollution from well head and transport spills and leaks, and water use and
contamination risks” (Wilkins et al., 2019, p. 14). On the other hand, the asset management
sector faces relatively low exposure to environmental and social risks. As a service provider, its
use of physical infrastructure and facilities is limited, thus producing low levels of GHG
emissions and pollution. The social risks they are exposed to from human capital management is
also relatively low as they typically employ a small and skilled workforce (Wilkins et al., 2019).
How diversity affects ESG

10

The level of diversity within a company can also affect ESG. Firms benefit from being
heterogenous as people with various experiences, skills and knowledge bring multiple
perspectives to the table. “Attitudes, cognitive functioning, and beliefs are not randomly
distributed in the population, but tend to vary systematically with demographic variables such as
age, race and gender,” (Robinson & Dechant, 1997, p. 27). Greater diversity can improve the
firm’s understanding of the marketplace. In an increasingly diverse market, firms can match the
diversity of the company to the market and gain a better understanding of the interest of multiple
stakeholder groups through representation. Firms can then appropriately respond to stakeholder
interests in their ESG initiatives. Greater diversity also encourages creativity and innovation
from the presence of various perspectives. Innovation exposes firms to more opportunities for
solutions that better address ESG factors.
Firms embracing diversity can also produce higher quality problem-solving (Robinson &
Dechant, 1997). Having a heterogenous group with varying backgrounds lets them see problems
from different perspectives and have a wider discussion of possible solutions and consequences
of each, including ESG initiatives. With various perspectives represented, firms can take into
better consideration ESG solutions that will address stakeholder needs.
Diversity within the board of directors
Just like diversity can benefit the company and improve its ESG performance, the same
can be true for the impact of board of director diversity on ESG. Traditionally, boards are groups
of people who come from similar socioeconomic backgrounds, have similar education and
professional training, and therefore have similar perspectives on business practices (Westphal &
Milton, 2000). The importance of board diversity draws upon the fact that our current society is
more multicultural and gender sensitive. Economies now demand from companies “sophisticated
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talent with global acumen, multi-cultural fluency, technological literacy, entrepreneurial skills,
and the ability to manage increasingly delayered, disaggregated organizations” (Chambers et al.,
1998, para. 7). Boards are recognizing the benefit of diversity and thinking about how they can
depart from uniformity and determine whether they have diverse perspectives that are required to
make today’s business decisions. “Diverse boards help to better represent all shareholders,
nurture better appreciation of “intangibles” like work/life issues and can help recruit and retain
top executive women and minorities” (Biggins, 1999, p. 2). In contrast, a less diverse board
could potentially cause a lack of critical thinking and innovation (Walt & Ingley, 2003).
Diversity within the board could prevent premature decision-making because they introduce
new, different perspectives to the discussion (Pletzer et al., 2015). This could reduce the risk
potential of the firm, hence improving ESG performance.
Diversity in corporate governance is defined as the composition of the board and the mix
of different attributes, expertise and characteristics that each board member has and how it
affects decision making and the board process. Characteristics that make up board diversity
include age, gender, ethnicity, culture, religion, constituency representation, independence,
professional background, knowledge, technical skills and expertise, commercial and industry
experience, career and life experience (Walt & Ingley, 2003).
Previous research on board gender diversity
Gender diversity within the board of directors is particularly interesting. As of 2018,
women held 22.5% of board seats among Fortune 500 companies. The number of board seats
held by women has continued to increase over the past years (compared to just 15.7% in 2004),
however women are still highly underrepresented (Catalyst, 2019).
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A number of previous studies have examined the relationship between board gender
diversity and firm performance however, results are mixed. Campbell and Mínguez Vera
sampled companies from Spain and found a positive effect on firm value (as measured by
Tobin’s Q) from board gender diversity. They suggested that firms should not just focus on
simply having women directors, because just their inclusion along will not affect firm value.
Firms should instead focus on the balance between women and men on the board, which they
showed increased firm value (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2007).
Carter, Simkins and Simpson studied Fortune 1000 firms and also found a positive
relationship between board diversity and Tobin’s Q. Their results showed that the percentage of
female and minority directors increased as firm size increased, but the percentage decreased if
the percentage of insiders increased (Carter et al., 2003).
Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader sampled U.S. firms and found that board diversity is
positively associated with firm financial performance indicators, namely ROA and ROI, because
increased diversity is associated with increased effectiveness of the board’s oversight function.
They argued that although conflict emerges with a diverse group of people, it improves oversight
because conflict allows them to consider a wider range of solutions (Erhardt et al., 2003).
Research, however, has not always detected a positive impact of board gender diversity
on firm performance. For example, Adams and Ferreira (2019) found that board gender diversity
had, on average, a negative effect on firm performance. They argue that studies that found a
positive relationship are not robust to their methods of addressing the endogeneity of gender
diversity, and that the true relationship is actually much more complex. They found that
increased diversity positively impacts firm performance in firms that have weak governance but
employing gender quotas could actually hurt firm value in firms that have strong governance
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(potentially due to excessive monitoring) They finally concluded that there is no support for
quota-based policy initiatives because there is no evidence that it would positively impact firm
performance on average (Adams & Ferreira, 2009).
Shrader, Blackburn and Iles sampled 200 U.S. firms and found a negative relationship
between board gender diversity and various measure of financial performance such as ROS,
ROA, ROE and ROI. They offered several potential explanations for these results. First, female
directors experience a disadvantage as they are typically assigned to board committees that do
not significantly impact the firm. Their second explanation is that the number of women on any
particular board has not reached a “critical mass” so there is not much of an impact, considering
the fact that on average there is only one female per board in their study (Shrader et al., 1997).
Mínguez-Vera and Martin found a negative relationship between board gender diversity
and ROE based on their studies of Spanish SMEs. They do not find support that adding women
to boards improves performance. They actually found that the risk-aversion of women instead
negatively impact firm performance. Female directors on Spanish SMEs have a larger capacity
for decision-making, which could lead to the adoption of less risky strategies and in turn
negatively affect performance (Mínguez-Vera & Martin, 2011).
Two meta-analyses sought to combine the body of research examining relations between
board gender diversity and firm performance. Both reported similar results. Post and Byron
found that although there is a positive relationship between female board representation and
accounting returns, there is a near zero relationship with market performance (Post & Byron,
2015). Pletzer, Nikolova, Kedzior and Voelpel’s meta-analysis, despite having a much smaller
sample size (20 studies compared to 140 studies in Post and Byron’s), found a small positive,
non-significant relationship between percentage of female directors and firm performance. They
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noted that the relationship between board gender diversity and firm performance is complex such
that examining direct links between board gender diversity and firm performance might be less
fruitful than exploring impacts of board gender diversity on intervening variables that
subsequently influence firm performance. That is, these authors concluded that there are
numerous variables that could be mediating or moderating relations between board gender
diversity and performance (Pletzer et al., 2015).
How board gender diversity affects ESG
Building on previous research and, in particular, suggestions that board gender diversity
possibly affects decisions and outcomes that the board has more direct control over than overall
firm performance (Post & Byron, 2015), this thesis investigates the indirect effects of board
gender diversity on firm performance through ESG performance. ESG is a tool to engage and
build relationships with stakeholders by improving the ethical, environmental, and social
standards of the firm’s operations. Collectively, these decisions can eventually lead to improved
corporate performance (Galbreath, 2016). Therefore, board gender diversity can positively
influence the firm’s corporate performance through its impact on the firm’s ESG initiatives that
engages with and reconciles the multiple interests of stakeholders.
Gender diversity within the board is particularly interesting because of the board’s role in
leading the company to success. The board is responsible for planning and executing strategic
goals and creating company culture (Birindelli et al., 2018). There are two main functions for the
board of directors: monitoring and advising. The monitoring role involves overseeing
management, guaranteeing financial transparency and becoming a fiduciary for its shareholders’
or the “watchdog.” The advising role involves giving guidance to the CEO and establishing
strategy (Crifo & Roudaut, 2018).
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Adams and Ferreira (2009) found that greater gender diversity on boards results in more
participation in strategic decision-making and tougher CEO monitoring. Their study found that
female directors have better attendance, and that their presence improves the attendance of male
directors. Female directors are also more likely to be assigned to monitoring-related committees,
such as auditing, nominating and corporate governance. As an indication that female directors
are tougher monitors, they found that CEO turnover is more sensitive to stock performance in
more gender diverse boards. There is also more alignment with shareholders’ interests as the
proportion of female directors is associated with more equity-based compensation. These
scholars do warn that too much board monitoring can have a negative effect instead, as too much
interference could break down communications between directors and managers, and ultimately
negatively affect performance (Adams & Ferreira, 2009).
Female directors bring important characteristics to the boardroom. For example, female
directors typically hold more advanced degrees than male directors and are less likely to come
from business backgrounds (e.g. community service organizations and academia). They also
report having more diverse interests outside of work and more interest in philanthropy and
community service. These differences in experience and worldviews expands the body of
knowledge that the board can take advantage of in their decision-making process (Post & Byron,
2015). Female leaders have exhibited risk-aversion, less radical decision-making, and a tendency
towards more sustainable investment strategies. They also lead in a more transformational way
compared to male leaders, showing more support and encouragement towards their colleagues.
Women directors were also found to hold their responsibilities as directors in higher regard,
which is associated with more effective corporate governance (Pletzer et al., 2015). Women
uphold certain values such as interdependence, benevolence and tolerance which helps draw out
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information and perspectives and aid in collaboration and discussion between board members
(Post & Byron, 2015). They also facilitate decision-making with a cooperative and democratic
approach and utilize participative communication and process orientation, which results in fair
decisions when meeting the needs and expectations of multiple stakeholders (Post & Byron,
2015; Birindelli et al., 2018).
Kim and Starks (2016) studied how female directors contribute to firm performance
through the board’s advisory role and found that they increased the advisory effectiveness
through providing unique skills to the board. Advisory effectiveness is measured by the
heterogeneity in functional expertise, and an increase in effectiveness has been linked to higher
firm value. They found that the addition of female directors provided more unique skills
previously lacking within the board compared to the addition of male directors. This suggests
that the increased heterogeneity in expertise brought on by new female directors increases the
board’s effectiveness. It follows that such gender heterogeneity leads to higher quality advice
relative to boards evidencing less gender heterogeneity. It is also interesting to note that often
missing expertise within the board, namely H.R., Risk Management, Sustainability, and
Political/Government, are more likely to be possessed by female rather than male directors (Kim
& Starks, 2016).
In sum, board gender diversity increases the heterogeneity of the board, as female
directors bring differences in knowledge, values and experiences. It is also associated with better
corporate governance through increased advisory effectiveness and tougher monitoring. Higher
levels of heterogeneity and better governance allow the board of directors to better consider
multiple stakeholder interests when considering sustainability strategies. I expect that more
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effective decision making will result in improved ESG performance, which in turn leads to better
overall firm performance. Stated formally:
H1: Board gender diversity is positively associated with ESG performance.
H2: Corporate performance of the firm is positively associated with ESG performance.
H3: The association between corporate performance and ESG performance is moderated
by the effect of board gender diversity.
Sample and data
Sample selection
The population of firms was comprised of the 1000 companies listed on the 2015 Fortune 1000
list. I chose the period of 2015-2016 because it had the most current data available on
Compustat, my primary data source. From those 1000 firms, I deleted firms with the SIC code
between 6000 and 6999 because they operate in the financial industry. This was done because
financial firms have a different structure in that they own primarily soft assets rather than hard
assets. Next, I removed firms that were involved in merger and acquisition activities in 2016 (i.e.
if the Compustat annual item “AQC” is not equal to zero or blank). Eliminating these firms was
important because the financial statements of those firms will be out of proportion due to
restructuring, hence becoming outliers. Finally, I deleted firms that had missing financial or ESG
data. The final sample consisted of 169 firms.
Variables
Table 1 provides a summary of all the variables used in the study.
Dependent variable ESG data is taken from TruValue Labs’ Insight Score for the 2016
fiscal year. TruValue uses natural language processing (NLP) and artificial intelligence (AI) to
continuously gather and interpret data from reports by various sources such as analysts,
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government regulators, media and advocacy groups. This provides an “outside-in” view of a
company, distinguishing TruValue Labs from other data sources that typically provide an
“inside-out” view, as it relies on company self-disclosure and is time-lagged (Malinak et al.,
2018).
TruValue Labs applies 26 different topics as defined by the Sustainability Accounting
Standards Board (SASB), including Environment, Social Capital, Human Capital, Business
Model & Innovation, and Leadership & Governance. They utilize the criteria established within
ESG frameworks, apply it to the reports and aggregate it into relevant ESG data for the
companies and sectors they cover. The ESG data is scored using a scale from 0 to 100. A neutral
impact is scored 50, while positive performance is scored above 50 and negative performance is
scored below 50 (Malinak et al., 2018).
The TruValue Insight Score provides a measure for a company’s long term ESG
performance. It is derived from the Pulse Score, which measures short term ESG performance.
The Pulse Score reflects the day to day sentiment of a company on a specific topic or ESG
category based on documents published that day, which allows real-time monitoring of
companies. The Insight Score is an exponentially weighted moving average of the Pulse score,
with a six month’s half-life for the influence of an event on the score (Malinak et al., 2018). I use
the Insight Score for the year of 2015 to account for a lagged effect (1-year lag).
I measure corporate performance through both operational performance and market
performance. Accordingly, operational performance is measured by an accounting-based
measure (ROA), while market performance is measured by a market-based measure (Tobin’s Q).
ROA is the net income divided by total assets, while Tobin’s Q is the market enterprise value
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divided by the total asset replacement value. Financial data were acquired from Compustat and
measured for the year of 2016.
Independent Variables The independent variable used in the model, B_DIV, measures
the percentage of women within a board of directors. It is the number of female directors divided
by the total board size at the end of the 2015 fiscal year. I use this as a proxy for board gender
diversity. Data for this variable were acquired from Bloomberg. In cases where Bloomberg did
not report board gender diversity, data were acquired from firms’ yearly proxy statements.
Control Variables I control for several variables that previous research has indicated
influences ESG performance. Unless otherwise indicated, data were acquired from Compustat.
First, I control for firm size. Larger firms have more resources and are more likely to realize
economies of scale through ESG initiatives. Second, leverage. A firm that is more highly
leveraged might prioritize debtholders over other stakeholders, thus engaging in less ESG. Third,
growth. A high-growth company is more likely to be scrutinized by creditors and hence
pressured to invest less in sustainability. Fourth, loss. A profitable firm has more capacity to
invest in sustainability. I coded loss as 1 if the firm experienced a loss for the 2015 fiscal year, 0
otherwise. Fifth, the representation of independent directors has been shown to positively
influence ESG as well. Data for board independence were acquired from Bloomberg. Finally,
industry. Firms operating in different industries have different pressures to invest in
sustainability, as well as different benefits. I accounted for the difference in industries by the first
2 digits of the SIC code for each firm.
Methodology and results
Regression model
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I use linear regression analyses to test out hypotheses. The first hypothesis studies
whether board gender diversity has a positive influence on ESG performance. ESG performance
(ESG) is the dependent variable and board gender diversity (B_DIV) is the independent variable.
The following model is estimated:
𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡
+ 𝛽5 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑 + 𝜀𝑡
(1)
Where, ESGt is the ESG score for the current period (2016); B_DIVt-1 is the percentage of female
directors for the previous period (2015); SIZE, LEVERAGE, GROWTH, LOSS and B_IND
represent the control variables, all measured for 2016 except B_IND (measured for 2015).
I expect the sign of SIZE to be positive, while the signs of LEVERAGE, GROWTH, and
LOSS to be negative. The expected sign of B_IND is also positive.
The second hypothesis tests whether corporate performance is positively associated with
ESG performance. I estimated two different models for each corporate performance measure,
Tobin’s Q (market-based) and ROA (accounting-based). The following models apply:
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡
+ 𝛽6 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑 + 𝜀𝑡
(2)
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡
+ 𝛽6 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑 + 𝜀𝑡
(3)
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where TOBINQt and ROAt are measures of corporate performance, measured for the current
period (2016). The other variables are the same as defined in Model (1). I expect the sign of ESG
to be positive, as better ESG performance is associated with better corporate performance.
To test the third hypothesis, I included interaction variables between ESG and both
B_DIV and B_IND to test whether board gender diversity moderates the association between
ESG and corporate performance. The following models are estimated:
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡
+ 𝛽6 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝐸𝑆𝐺 × 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝛽9 𝐸𝑆𝐺 × 𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑 + 𝜀𝑡
(4)
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡
+ 𝛽6 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝐸𝑆𝐺 × 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝛽9 𝐸𝑆𝐺 × 𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑 + 𝜀𝑡
(5)
where ESG×B_DIV is the interaction term between ESG and board gender diversity (B_DIV).
ESG×B_IND is the interaction term between ESG and board independence (B_IND). The other
variables are the same as defined in Models (1), (2), and (3).
Descriptive statistics
Table 2 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics. The average asset size of
sampled firms is $22.7bn. In general, the sample firms are profitable, with an average net income
of $853.7mn and a median of $297.8mn. The mean level of leverage of the firms, as measured
by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, is 0.6433, with a median of 0.6523. On average, the
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market to book ratio of the sample firms is 6.0728. For the performance indicators, the average
ROA is 3.53% and the average Tobin’s Q is 1.8703.
The average ESG score is 60.67. A score of 50 indicates neutral impact, so the average
score means that the sample firms in general have a positive ESG impact. The board size, on
average, is 10.4 members, with the largest board having 17 directors and smallest having 5
directors. On average, there are 1.8 women serving on the board of directors. The most gender
diverse board in the sample had five females. The average board gender diversity, as measured
by percentage of female directors in the board, is only 16.44%. The most gender diverse board
had 50% female directors and the least gender diverse board had no females. On average,
81.94% of the directors on the board are independent (i.e. not employed by the company), with a
standard deviation of 11.62%.
Correlation results
Table 3 provides the Pearson correlation matrix for all variables. ESG is 19.72%
negatively correlated with SIZE at the p=.05 significance level, and 25.58% negatively correlated
with ROA at the .01 significance. Board gender diversity (B_DIV) is positively correlated with
SIZE (21.33%) and LEVERAGE (17.83%) at the 1 percent and 5 percent significance
respectively. Board independence is 29.57% positively correlated with board gender diversity at
the 1 percent significance. I do not find a significant correlation between ESG and both board
independence and board gender diversity. TOBINQ and ROA are correlated by 48.45% at the 1
percent significance.
Regression results
Table 4 provides the results for model 1 (H1). Board gender diversity has no significant
impact on ESG performance (0.0561, p-value = 0.9957). Therefore, there is no support for a

23

positive effect of board gender diversity on the firm’s ESG performance, rejecting H1.
Regarding the control variables, SIZE had a significant negative association with ESG
performance (-3.8138, p-value = 0.0328). Contrary to expectations, LEVERAGE has positive
modestly significant association with ESG performance (11.3698, p-value = 0.0694).
Table 5 provides results relevant to the influences on market performance (Tobin’s Q)
associated with models 2 (H2) and 4 (H3). Board gender diversity approaches significant
association with Tobin’s Q (0.7494, p-value = 0.093) when I do not control for industry. When
the interaction variables are included, B_DIV is no longer significantly associated with firm
performance (2.0476, p-value = 0.3379). In models where the industry dummies are included,
B_IND has a negative association with TOBINQ, significant at 10% (-0.8224, p-value = 0.0696).
Additionally, there is no significant relationship between B_DIV and TOBINQ in the models with
the industry dummies. In all models, ESG is not significantly associated with TOBINQ at all.
Overall, I do not find support for H2 and H3 for market performance.
Table 6 provides results relevant to the influences on accounting-based performance
(ROA) associated with models 3 (H2) and 5 (H3). I find a significant positive relationship
between board gender diversity and ROA (0.0936, p-value = 0.0491). There is also a positive
association between ESG and ROA albeit with a very small coefficient (0.0009, p-value =
0.0654). These relationships lose significance in models where I do not control for industries.
Hence, there is weak and mixed evidence in support of H2. In models with the interaction
variable between ESG and B_DIV, there is no significant relationship between the dependent
variable (ROA) and each of ESG (0.0013, p-value = 0.4255), B_DIV (0.0631, p-value = 0.8159)
and ESG×B_DIV (0.0006, p-value = 0.8918). This implies that the association between ESG and
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ROA is not moderated by board gender diversity. Therefore, I do not find support for H3 for
ROA, the operational performance measure.
Discussion
Based on the regression results, I do not find a significant relationship between board
gender diversity and ESG performance, therefore rejecting the first hypothesis. There is mixed
evidence in support of the second hypothesis, with results showing no association between ESG
and Tobin’s Q and very weak evidence supporting a positive relationship between ESG and
ROA. Finally, there is no support for the third hypothesis regarding the moderation of the
relationship between ESG and corporate performance by board gender diversity, as I do not find
significance in the relationship between the interaction variables and the dependent variables.
There are several possible reasons that could explain why I did not find an effect of board
gender diversity on ESG performance. One possible reason relates to the board’s function. The
board’s main function to monitor managerial behavior and to provide advice to the CEO, not to
make operational or strategic decisions. CEOs and the top management team are the decision
makers in the firm, so instead it could be that they are the ones that have more of a say in
deciding what ESG initiatives the firm should undertake. It would be an interesting question for
future research to study the effect of female CEOs on ESG performance instead of the board
characteristics.
Another explanation for the lack of significance could be addressed by including an
additional control variable. Future research could consider controlling for the existence of a
sustainability committee within the board of directors. To have directors who have specific
education or prior experience with sustainability would directly increase heterogeneity of skills
within the board. Having a dedicated board committee towards sustainability could also explain
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how a firm could be more focused towards their ESG performance. The existence of a
sustainability committee could be positively linked towards ESG performance and firm
performance, so it would be interesting to control for that aspect in future research.
Most of these firms also had not reached the critical mass of three female directors on the
board, hence explaining the lack of impact on both ESG performance and corporate
performance. On average the firms included in this study only had 2 female directors on the
board. Konrad and Kramer (2006) argue that three or more women are needed to “achieve the
‘critical mass’ that can cause a fundamental change in the boardroom and enhance corporate
governance” (p. 19). Having only one woman on the board has been associated with tokenism,
with previous female directors who served solo reporting being both visible and invisible, being
stereotyped and seen as a representation of all women. Only after having three or more women
on the board is the presence of women normalized, and the female directors feel more
comfortable speaking out on issues that raise their concern and be less worried about being
associated with other women. Although this paper did not focus heavily on studying the effect of
the critical mass, this could be an improvement to be implemented in future research.
Another potential explanation from a measurement issue is that the time lag used in this
study was too short. I only accounted for a one-year time lag for the effect of board gender
diversity (using 2015 board data against 2016 ESG performance). It could be that board
decisions associated with firms’ ESG initiatives take a much longer time for their influences to
be felt and subsequently be reflected in a firm’s ESG scores. Future research could implement
longer time lags (e.g., three or five years) to more appropriately account for the effect of board
gender diversity on ESG performance.

26

I could not find strong support for the positive relationship between ESG and corporate
performance, and it could be that ESG had an impact on strategic decision making instead of
directly on corporate performance. Management might look at their firm’s low ESG score and
use it to reflect on their current strategies. Their low current ESG performance could make them
take the initiative to implement a different ESG strategy in order to become more sustainable and
improve their ESG performance in the future. Research could instead look at the impact of ESG
scores of strategic decision making, which would in turn impact the overall performance of the
firm.
No study is without its limitations. I restricted the sample to only U.S. firms. Firms
operate within the context of society and culture, so it would be interesting for future research to
explore the international context. I can consider how country-specific culture could impact the
relationship with both ESG and firm performance. Cultural context could moderate the extent to
which women can have an impact on the board and bring fundamental change. I could replicate
the study and choose firms from a different country, or another approach would be to include
firms from worldwide and control for country.
Follow-up Study
The previous sections discussed results from the models proposed in my thesis. In
reviewing results, I questioned whether the model could be improved in substantive ways. One
area that drew my attention was associated with my two performance indicators. I previously
saw that ROA and Tobin’s Q are highly correlated by 48.45% (p=.01). The level of operational
performance could determine how the market perceives corporate performance to be. Therefore,
in this post-hoc analysis, ROA was added as a control variable to the Tobin’s Q model. I reestimated the following equations to test H2 and H3:
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𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡
+ 𝛽6 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒 + 𝜀𝑡
(6)
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡
+ 𝛽6 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛽9 𝐸𝑆𝐺 × 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷
+ 𝛽10 𝐸𝑆𝐺 × 𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑 + 𝜀𝑡
(7)
where ROAt is the firm’s return on assets (operational performance measure) for the current
period (2016) and the other variables are the same as defined earlier.
Table 7 provides the results for Models (6) and (7). Board gender diversity (B_DIV) is
not significantly associated with market performance. Board independence (B_IND) is
negatively associated with Tobin’s Q in both models. There is no significant association between
ESG and Tobin’s Q, which is consistent with previous results. The interaction variables are also
not significantly associated with Tobin’s Q. The added control variable, ROA, is as expected
positively associated with Tobin’s Q, significant at 5% in both models. This implies that better
operational performance does positively affect the market perception of the firm, therefore
resulting in better market performance. But overall, there is no support for H2 and H3 based on
these results.
Conclusion
It’s important for firms to engage with their many stakeholders and manage the multiple,
often conflicting, interests between them. Having more women on the board could allow the
board to better consider multiple stakeholder interests, as women increase the heterogeneity of a
board’s skills, its collective knowledge and experience, and could, generally, improve the level
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of governance. This result is improved ESG performance, which could lead to better overall
corporate performance.
Despite the intuitive appeal of board gender diversity, I did not find support that higher
gender diversity within the board of directors leads to better ESG performance. There is also
mixed evidence in support of a positive relationship between ESG performance and corporate
performance. There is a positive association with operational performance, but no support for
market performance. In addition, I found no support that there is a moderation of the relationship
between ESG performance and corporate performance by board gender diversity. From this, I
conclude that board gender diversity, in itself, does not directly lead to better ESG performance
and corporate performance. There are many factors to account for in this highly complex
relationship, so further research is needed to analyze and determine how board gender diversity
ultimately affects both ESG and corporate performance.
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Appendix
Figure 1: Conceptual Model

Board Gender
Diversity

ESG

Financial
Performance

Table 1: Variables
Variable

Explanation

AT

is the total assets (in millions) at the end of the fiscal year 2016

B_DIV

is the number of female directors divided by the total board size at the
end of the fiscal year 2015; where board gender diversity is
Bloomberg Terminal item “% of Women on Board”

B_IND

is the number of independent directors divided by the total board size
at the end of the fiscal year 2015, where board independence is
Bloomberg Terminal item “% of Independent Directors”

ESG

is the TruValue Insight score at the end of the fiscal year 2016.

GROWTH

is the natural log of the ratio of market to book value of equity at the
end of the fiscal year 2016, i.e., = log(MKT2BOOK)

Industry Dummies

is the first 2 digits of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code

LEVERAGE

is the ratio of liabilities to assets at the end of the fiscal year 2016,
i.e., = Compustat annual items “LT” ÷ “AT”

LT

is the total liabilities (in millions) at the end of the fiscal year 2016

LOSS

=1 if the firm’s net income (Compustat annual item “NI”) in 2015 is
negative; otherwise = 0
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MKT2BOOK

is the ratio of market to book value of equity at the end of the fiscal
year 2016, i.e., = Compustat annual items “CSHO” x “PRCC_F” ÷
“BKVLPS”

NI

is the net income (in millions) at the end of the fiscal year 2016

ROA

is the net income divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal year
2016; i.e. = Compustat annual items “NI” ÷ “AT”

SALE

is the total sales (in millions) at the end of the fiscal year 2016

SIZE

is the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the fiscal year
2016, i.e., =log(Compustat annual item “AT”)

TOBINQ

is the market enterprise value divided by the total asset replacement
value at the end of the fiscal year 2016; i.e. = Compustat annual items
(“AT” + “CSHO” x “PRCC_F” – “CEQ”) ÷ “AT”
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TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variablesa
AT
SIZE
LT
NI
SALE
ROA
TOBINQ
MKT2BOOK
GROWTH
LEVERAGE
ESG
B_DIV
B_IND
BOARDSIZE
WOMENONBOARD

N
169
169
169
169
169
169
169
169
169
169
169
169
169
169
169

Mean
22738.91
3.9889
15405.68
853.6620
14605.45
0.0353
1.8703
6.0728
0.5058
0.6433
60.6656
0.1644
0.8194
10.46
1.76

Notes: aSee Table 1 for variable definitions

Median
9435.66
3.9748
5474.00
297.8
6527.80
0.0358
1.5354
2.5938
0.4139
0.6523
62.3164
0.1667
0.8571
11
2

Minimum
246.8720
2.3925
95.5600
-6177
693
-0.3735
0.8975
0.1300
-0.8861
0.1093
29.6732
0
0.4286
5
0

Maximum
330314
5.5189
208668
14239
197518
0.3194
5.3658
175.0714
2.2432
0.9784
86.6664
0.5
0.9142
17
5

Std. Dev
39800.08
0.5669
27263.26
2397.88
29283.09
0.0876
0.9494
15.3580
0.4011
0.1740
11.8785
0.0911
0.1162
2.10
1.07
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TABLE 3: Correlations
AT
1.0000

AT
SIZE
LT
NI
SALE
ROA
TOBINQ
MKT2BOOK
GROWTH
LEVERAGE

SIZE
LT
0.7240 0.9619
***
***
1.0000 0.7230
***
1.0000

NI
0.5310
***
0.4501
***
0.5286
***
1.0000

SALE
0.8498
***
0.5765
***
0.8331
***
0.5223
***
1.0000

ROA
TOBINQ
0.0149 -0.0930

MKT2BOOK GROWTH
-0.0503
-0.0629

0.0127 -0.1310

-0.0732

-0.0374

0.0142 -0.0956

-0.0281

-0.0316

0.5500 0.1946
***
**
0.0699 0.0134

0.0393

0.1759
**
0.0134

1.0000 0.4845
***
1.0000

0.1598
**
0.3840
***
1.0000

-0.0073

0.3468
***
0.7015
***
0.6708
***
1.0000

LEVERAGE
ESG
0.1128
-0.1972
**
0.2091
-0.1930
***
**
0.2160
-0.1648
***
**
0.0672
-0.0443
0.1066
-0.1360
*
-0.0890
0.3108
***
0.3763
***
1.0000

ESG

-0.1437
*
0.2558
***
0.0215
0.0426
0.0768
0.0767
1.0000

B_DIV
B_IND

Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significant correlations at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively

B_DIV
0.2133
***
0.2213
***
0.2416
***
0.1872
**
0.1909
**
0.0938

B_IND
0.1713
**
0.2833
***
0.1585
**
0.1368
*
0.1190

0.1046

0.0171

0.1330
*
0.1445
*
0.1783
**
0.0613

0.0664

1.0000

0.2957
***
1.0000

0.0987

0.1046
0.1201
0.0143
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TABLE 4: Regression results
Dependent variable: ESG
Variable
Intercept
SIZE
LEVERAGE
GROWTH
LOSS
B_IND
B_DIV
Industry dummies
# of Observations
Adjusted R-square (%)

Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
(p-value)a
(p-value)a
(p-value)a
74.8534*** 78.0123*** 75.7486***
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
-5.5777*** -5.5626*** -5.7531***
(0.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
11.6093**
11.2223**
11.2171**
(0.0236)
(0.0282)
(0.0271)
-3.2752
-3.3287
-3.4147
(0.1379)
(0.1264)
(0.1200)
-12.1127*** -12.0393*** -12.0192***
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
5.4560
3.9788
(0.5583)
(0.6731)
9.2087
8.0348
(0.3127)
(0.3723)
169
169
169
17.29%
17.50%
17.12%

Coefficient
(p-value)a
66.6574***
(<.0001)
-3.8132**
(0.0356)
11.3737*
(0.0676)
-1.7040
(0.4875)
-9.8608***
(0.0031)
4.2491
(0.6700)
Included
169
23.84%

Coefficient
(p-value)a
70.2516***
(<.0001)
-3.7161**
(0.0354)
11.3214*
(0.0732)
-1.5428
(0.5146)
-10.1218***
(0.0029)
0.8170
(0.9360)
Included
169
23.71%

Coefficient
(p-value)a
66.6606***
(<.0001)
-3.8138**
(0.0328)
11.3698*
(0.0694)
-1.7045
(0.4870)
-9.8590***
(0.0034)
4.2427
(0.6754)
0.0561
(0.9957)
Included
169
23.21%

Notes:
𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡
+ 𝛽5 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑 + 𝜀𝑡
(1)
a

p-values are based on White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent variance covariance matrix.

***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

TABLE 5: Regression results
Dependent variable: TOBINQ
Variable

ESG×B_IND

Coefficient (2)
(p-value)a
2.7311***
(<.0001)
-0.0432
(0.5670)
-2.2237***
(<.0001)
1.9984***
(<.0001)
-0.0462
(0.6495)
-0.0022
(0.5608)
-0.3042
(0.3361)
0.7494*
(0.0930)
-

ESG×B_DIV

-

Intercept
SIZE
LEVERAGE
GROWTH
LOSS
ESG
B_IND
B_DIV

Industry dummies
# of Observations
Adjusted R-square (%)

169
62.73%

Coefficient (4)
(p-value)a
3.7787***
(0.0040)
-0.0405
(0.5909)
-2.2604***
(<.0001)
1.9986***
(<.0001)
-0.0491
(0.6322)
-0.0201
(0.3105)
-1.8486
(0.2285)
2.0476
(0.3379)
0.0265
(0.2813)
-0.0218
(0.5014)
169
62.44%

Coefficient (2)
(p-value)a
3.1553***
(0.0002)
0.0636
(0.4750)
-2.4588***
(<.0001)
2.1884***
(<.0001)
-0.0250
(0.8797)
0.0018
(0.6284)
-0.8224*
(0.0696)
0.5670
(0.2514)
Included
169
67.72%

Coefficient (4)
(p-value)a
4.7349***
(0.0003)
0.0720
(0.4310)
-2.4966***
(<.0001)
2.1842***
(<.0001)
-0.0324
(0.8447)
-0.0255
(0.1860)
-2.7296*
(0.0615)
0.1638
(0.9392)
0.0335
(0.1580)
0.0058
(0.8771)
Included
169
67.50%

Notes:
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡
+ 𝛽6 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑 + 𝜀𝑡
(2)
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡
+ 𝛽6 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝐸𝑆𝐺 × 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝛽9 𝐸𝑆𝐺 × 𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑 + 𝜀𝑡
(4)
a

p-values are based on White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent variance covariance matrix.

***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

TABLE 6: Regression results
Dependent variable: ROA
Variable

ESG×B_IND

Coefficient (3)
(p-value)a
0.0454
(0.3350)
0.0057
(0.4846)
-0.1256***
(0.0001)
0.0571***
(0.0003)
-1.413***
(<.0001)
0.0003
(0.5074)
0.0309
(0.3137)
0.0194
(0.6324)
-

ESG×B_DIV

-

Intercept
SIZE
LEVERAGE
GROWTH
LOSS
ESG
B_IND
B_DIV

Industry dummies
# of Observations
Adjusted R-square (%)

169
57.26%

Coefficient (5)
(p-value)a
0.1278
(0.2218)
0.0057
(0.4806)
-0.1288***
(0.0001)
0.0571***
(0.0003)
-0.1418***
(<.0001)
-0.0011
(0.4643)
-0.1005
(0.4354)
0.1845
(0.4198)
0.0023
(0.2794)
-0.0028
(0.4255)
169
56.90%

Coefficient (3)
(p-value)a
0.0618
(0.3268)
0.0195**
(0.0479)
-0.1745***
(<.0001)
0.0672***
(<.0001)
-0.1098***
(<.0001)
0.0009*
(0.0654)
-0.0011
(0.9713)
0.0936**
(0.0491)
Included
169
65.94%

Coefficient (5)
(p-value)a
0.0366
(0.7543)
0.0196**
(0.0453)
-0.1739***
(<.0001)
0.0672***
(<.0001)
-0.1093***
(<.0001)
0.0013
(0.4255)
0.0347
(0.8117)
0.0631
(0.8159)
-0.0006
(0.7948)
0.0006
(0.8918)
Included
169
65.37%

Notes:
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡
+ 𝛽6 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑 + 𝜀𝑡
(3)
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡
+ 𝛽6 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝐸𝑆𝐺 × 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝛽9 𝐸𝑆𝐺 × 𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑 + 𝜀𝑡
(5)
a

p-values are based on White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent variance covariance matrix.

***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

TABLE 7: Regression results
Dependent variable: TOBINQ
Variable

ESG×B_IND

Coefficient (6)
(p-value)a
3.02306***
(0.0002)
0.02175
(0.8080)
-2.08513***
(<.0001)
2.04440***
(<.0001)
0.21002
(0.2902)
-0.00007298
(0.9840)
2.14141**
(0.0381)
-0.81994*
(0.0563)
0.36076
(0.4350)
-

ESG×B_DIV

-

Intercept
SIZE
LEVERAGE
GROWTH
LOSS
ESG
ROA
B_IND
B_DIV

Industry dummies
# of Observations
Adjusted R-square (%)

Included
169
68.79%

Coefficient (7)
(p-value)a
4.65589***
(0.0002)
0.02977
(0.7441)
-2.12153***
(<.0001)
2.03924***
(<.0001)
0.20341
(0.3012)
-0.02838
(0.1304)
2.15706**
(0.0374)
-2.80437**
(0.0398)
0.02766
(0.9901)
0.03486
(0.1205)
0.00449
(0.9060)
Included
169
68.61%

Notes:
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡
+ 𝛽6 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒 + 𝜀𝑡
(6)
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡
+ 𝛽6 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛽9 𝐸𝑆𝐺 × 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷
+ 𝛽10 𝐸𝑆𝐺 × 𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑 + 𝜀𝑡
(7)
a

p-values are based on White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent variance covariance matrix.

***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

